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Abstract 
Economists and psychologists have recently been developing new theories of decision making 
under uncertainty that can accommodate the observed violations of standard statistical 
decision theoretic axioms by experimental subjects. We propose a procedure which finds 
a collection of decision rules that best explain the behavior of experimental subjects. The 
procedure is a combination of maximum likelihood estimation of the rules together with an 
implicit classification of subjects to the various rules, and a penalty for having too many 
rules . \Ve prove that our procedure yields consistent estimates (as the number of tasks per 
subject. and the number of subjects go to infinity) of the number of rules being used, the 
rules themselves, and the proportion of our population using each of the rules. We apply our 
procedure to data on probabil ist ic updating by subjects in four different universities. We get 
remarkably robust results which show that the most important rules used by the subjects 
are Bayes rule, representativeness rule (ignoring the prior) , and conservatism (over-weighting 
the prior) .  In our procedure, the subjects are allowed to make errors, and our estimated 
error rate is typically 20%. 
*The first coauthor acknowledges financial support from NSF grant #SES-9223701 to the Cal­
ifornia Institute of Technology. We thank the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for giving us access to 
their Cray YMP, on which all of our calculations were made. 
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1 Introduction
The economic theory of decision making under uncertainty has been seriously challenged by 
a series of discoveries of violations of that theory by experimental subjects. The paradoxes of 
Allais ( 1953) and Ells berg ( 1 96 1) are among the earliest examples, but recently, psychologists 
have added several others. Among the more recent violations of statistical decision theory 
are framing effects, certainty effects, common ratio effects (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) , 
preference reversals (Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) ,  Grether and Plott (1979)) , to name but 
a few.  Part of the economists' response to these developments has been the introduction of 
a number of new theoretical models of decision making designed to be consistent with some 
of the reported violations of expected utility theory. Among those theories are Machina 
(1982)'s "fanning out". (Loomes and Sugden (1987) , Bell (1982))'s regret theory, Chew 
( 1983)'s generalized weighted utility theory, (Quigen (1982) , Yaari (1987)) 's rank dependent 
utility, and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 's prospect theory. 
While economists have been introducing new models of individual decision making, psy­
chologists have developed a number of heuristic explanations of specific individual behaviors. 
For preference reversals, those models include Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971)'s anchoring 
and adjustment, Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) 's expression theory, Bostic et al. (1990) 's 
response mode, Loomes et al. (1989) 's regret , Tversky et al. (1988)'s contingent weighting 
theory, Mellers et al. ( 1992)'s change of process theory, Birnbaum et al. (1992)'s configural 
weighting theory. Research on judgement of probabilities has produced an array of heuris­
tics which individuals use in different circumstances (c.f. Tversky and Kahneman (1974)). 
Prominent heuristics include Kahneman and Tversky (1972) 's representativeness, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1972)'s avai lability, Edwards (1982)'s conservatism, and Lichtenstein and 
Slovic (197l)'s anchoring and adjustment. Recent research (e.g. Payne (1982) , Gigerenzer 
et al . ( 1991) ) suggests that the dependence of such heuristics on the specific context of the 
decision ·making-ex-periment-is .. nobfttlly-u'ftderst00d. 
One clear suggestion of the above referenced literature is the need to develop theories 
of decision making under uncertainty which are built on an empirically justified foundation. 
The li terature in its current state does not support the conclusion that economic subjects 
are sufficiently homogeneous to be described by a single theory. Different subjects may use 
different decision rules, and if the rules they use do not yield satisfactory outcomes, they 
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may abandon them and use different ones ( c.f. Mellers et al. ( 1992)). In this paper, we 
devise and use a general estimation/ classification procedure which uncovers the most likely 
collection of rules that experimental subjects use. The procedure is quite simple in nature. 
We start by choosing a class of decision rules that the subjects may use. The class of decision 
rules provides us with a class of likelihood functions for each data point. For a fixed number 
of rules in our class, we estimate the maximum likelihood collection of rules that the agents 
are using, as well as the proportions of our population using each of the rules. By adding an 
information criterion that penalizes our procedure for admitting more rules, our procedure 
achieves consistent estimates (as the number of tasks that each individual .performs in the 
experiment , and the number of individuals , go to infinity) of the number of rules being used, 
the rules themselves, and the proportion of the population using each of the rules. 
It is clear that our general procedure is applicable in a variety of situations where a class 
of data generating processes is considered, and our sample is not assumed to be generated 
by only one of those data generating processes. The applications of our procedure are not 
restricted to decision making experiments,  or even to experimental settings. However, our 
consistency results use the fact that in experimental settings, we can let the number of 
tasks per individual , and the number of individuals, get large to obtain estimates within a 
required tolerance level . In environments where a finite data sample is given, we typically 
cannot choose the design and the sample sizes to get our estimates of the collection of data 
generating processes within a pre-specified tolerance of their true values. We emphasize the 
fact that finite sample bias and misclassification corrections may be needed when analyzing 
given experimental data, but that issues of optimal experimental design should be seriously 
considered to minimize the need for such corrections. 
We close this introduction by briefly comparing our approach to the vast and growing 
literature on classification and clustering. The main difference that we want to point out is 
that a primary goal of the classical classification literature is to establish simple algorithms 
that work for a very large class of problems. For example, Wallace and Boulton (1968) 's 
Snob (and later Snob 2) program, and Cheeseman (1988) 's Autoclass II  program assume 
normality of the data generating process. In contrast , our approach does not rely on a 
custom-made algorithm. The general procedure we use agrees with all likelihood-based 
classification procedures in its form, but the class of likelihood functions is suggested by the 
problem. In that sense, we are closer to the modern coding theoretic approach to estimation 
and classification (e.g. Wallace and Freeman (1987), Rissanen (1987)) . In that literature, 
the class of likelihood functions is used as a means for summarizing the important aspects in 
a data set . The trade-off between using simpler classes of likelihood functions and explaining 
the data better is explicitly treated in that literature. In our framework, where the number 
of tasks per experimental subject, and the.numb.er.oLsubjects.,.goJ.o • .infinity, we prove that 
any strictly increasing penalty function (with bounded increments) for the complexity of our 
model wil l  yield consistency of our estimates of the number of classes, the classes themselves, 
and the proportions of the population in each of the classes. Specific penalty functions from 
the literature (e.g. Akaike ( 1974)'s famous criterion) will work. We derive a particular 
pseudo-Bayesian penalty function that seems appropriate for our example. 
2 
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. In section 2, we describe the col­
lection of experiments that we analyze in this paper. In section 3, we discuss the difficul­
ties encountered in a brute-force classification approach, and introduce a class of decision 
rules that reduces the computational burden to feasible levels. In section 4, we present our 
likelihood-based estimation/ classification procedure for the particular application at hand, 
and motivate a particular penalty function for the number of classes allowed. In section 5, 
we state our estimation/ classification procedure in its general form which is applicable in 
many more contexts, and prove the consistency of our estimates of the number of classes, the 
classes themselves, and the proportion of the population belonging to each of the classes. In 
section 6, we discuss the methods used for implementing our procedure in our application, 
and discuss the results that we obtain from the experiments described in section 2. In that 
section, we also address some of the suboptimal properties that our procedure may possess 
in finite samples, and discuss how they can be ameliorated by considerations of optimal 
experimental design. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2 The Experiments
The experimental data that we use in this paper were collected at four different educational 
institutions. Subjects were recruited from economics classes at UCLA, Occidental College, 
California State University at Los Angeles, and Pasadena City College. The subjects were 
told that they were to participate in an economics experiment, and that they would be payed 
for their participation. Upon arrival , the subjects were randomly divided into two groups. 
The procedures were identical for both groups except for the method of payment . The two 
groups performed the experimental tasks independently in two different rooms. 
In each room, there were three bingo cages. One cage contained s ix balls numbered 
one through six. this cage was used to generate the priors which were of the form: if one 
through m is drawn, use cage A, othe rwise use cage B. Cages A and B were the 
populations from which the observations were drawn: 
Cage A contained six balls, four labelled N and two labelled G. 
Cage B also contained six balls, three with each letter. 
At the beginning of each experiment , the instructions were read and the subjects elected 
one person to serve as a monitor. The monitors inspected all equipment, observed the draws 
from the cages and, generally, checked to be sure that the experimenters were being truthful. 
The monitors did not communicate with the subjects outside of their duties as monitor. The 
monitors were guaranteed a payment at least equal to the average received by subjects in 
their rooms. 
The experiment proceeded as follows. Cages A and B were placed behind an opaque 
screen, and a prior was announced. The prior cage was spun and a ball selected thus 
determining whether cage A or cage B would be used. The three prior rules used were two, 
three or four chances out of six for cage A. The cage selected was placed in the front of 
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the room and six draws (with replacement) were performed, and the results were announced 
and written on a blackboard. Subjects also recorded the outcomes on their answer sheets. 
Subjects were then asked to indicate which cage they believe was used in generating the 
observations. After all subjects had indicated which cage they felt was the more likely, a 
new prior was announced, and the procedures were repeated. 
In one room, all subjects were payed a flat fee. In the other room, one task was selected 
(randomly, using a bingo cage) , and subjects earned a $ 10 bonus if their response was correct. 
A response was considered correct if the cage the subject stated was the more likely was in 
fact the cage from which the balls were drawn. The sessions lasted-approximately one and 
one half hours, and the number of decisions made by each subject ranged from 14 to 21. The 
raw data is reported in Tables 1-8 of Appendix B. The instructions and a sample answer 
sheet for experimental subjects are shown in Appendix C. 
3 A Natural Class of Decision Rules
Ignoring the order of the draws, there are seven possible outcomes of the draws (zero through 
six N's) and three priors , resulting in 21 possible decision situations. In each of these 
situations, the subjects could chose either cage A or cage B. Therefore, there are in principle
221 = 2, 097, 1 52 possible decision rules. This is a very large number, and ,  fortunately, most
of those rules can be excluded by very simple rationality considerations. S ince cage A has a 
higher proportion of N's than cage B ,  the outcome most strongly favoring cage B would be 
no N's (six G's), and the one most strongly favoring cage A would be six N's (no G's). A 
natural rule would be to have a cutoff number for each of the priors, such that if the number 
of N's exceeds that cutoff number, the rule selects cage A, otherwise it selects cage B. 
By imposing the cutoff class of rules discussed above, we need to decide how to treat 
the behavior of a subject who is observed choosing cage B when some number of N's has 
been observed , and then choosing A when a smaller number has been observed. We shall 
introduce the possibility of experimental subjects making errors (i.e. deviating from the 
rule). This will allow each of our decision rules (which for our data will simply be a triple 
of numbers between zero and six) to give a positive probability (likelihood) to all possible 
patterns of behavior. We shall assume that each subject uses a decision rule ( ci, c2, c3), of
the form: under prior i, choose cage A if the number of N's observed is greater than Ci, and 
choose cage B otherwise .  With probability t, however, the subject trembles and makes a 
random choice . In other words, for each decision (given a prior, and a number of N 's drawn) 
with probability (1 - d the subject follows the rule (c1,c2,c3), and with probability t the
subject chooses cage A with probability 1/2 and cage B with probability 1/2. Now, the 
number of possible rules {(c1,c2,c3);-l:::; c;:::; 6;i = 1, 2, 3} is 83 = 512 (where c/s are
integers. and we use -1 as the lower bound corresponding to always choosing cage A,  even 
if zero N's were observed). If we further restrict the set of rules by requiring that Ci 2: Cj 
if i 2 j (i .e .  given a stronger prior in favor of cage B ,  a subject should require at least as 
many N·s to choose cage A), there are only 84 possible rules. 
There is a potential identification problem which arises because of the possibility of agents 
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making errors. We could model randomness by having individuals use a rule with probability 
(1 - x), and deviate with probability x. In that framework, consider a subject who for the
same prior and outcome chooses cage A lOOx percent of the time and B 100(1 - x) percent
of the time. The subject could be seen as choosing cage A but making a mistake 100(1 - x) 
percent of the time, or choosing cage B but making a mistake lOOx percent of the time.
Thus, for each of our 221 conceivable decision rules, together with an error rate, there is  
another rule (the opposite of the first), and another error rate (one less the first) which is  
observationally equivalent to that rule. Notice that by imposing the restriction to the class of 
cutoff rules described above, this identification problem does not arise since those opposite 
decision rules are rendered inadmissible (except for the rules that always pick cage A, or 
always pick cage B) . 
4 A Likelihood-Based Estimation/Classification Pro­
cedure 
As stated in the previous section, we have restricted attention to a class of decision rules 
which can be written as ( c1, c2, c3) where c; is the cutoff rule used when prior i is induced.
Prior 1 corresponds to cage A having probability 1/3, prior 2 to cage A having probability 
1 /2, and prior 3 corresponds to cage A having prior probability 2/3. We assume that each 
of our subjects uses one such rule ( c�, c;, cj) from the class (! = {( cll c2, c3): -1 � c; �
6; i = 1 ,  2, 3}. As we have already pointed out, the class (! has 83 = 512 elements. We shall
allow different subjects to be using different rules. We further assume that the error rate E 
discussed above is the same for all subjects, and all tasks. For each rule c = (Ci, c2, c3), and
error rate E, we get a likelihood function r·' E J, where the class J consists of all likelihood
functions for (c, E) 1:;: Q: x [O, l]. For a subjects, given a sequence of observations xr, ... 'x:., 
where x� =(pr, Nr, ar), Pr E {l, 2, 3} is the prior, Nr is the number of N's observed, and ar 
is the choice (A or B) of the subject, define the variable 
x
• :::: { 1 if (ar=A and Nr > Cpr) or (ar=B and Nr � Cpr ) ;  
c,r 0 otherwise 
Now define the sufficient statistic x; = :L�'=1 x�,r· Then under rule c = ( c1, c2, c3), and error
rate (, the likelihood function r·' can easily be computed as follows: 
Now. we observe data on n experimental subjects, with each subject s being observed 
over t. tasks. If we assume that all agents are using the same rule c E (!, then we can 
estimate ( c, f) by the maximum likelihood estimates: 
n 
(c, f.) = argmaxC,( II r·'(x�, ... 'x:J. 
s=l 
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If we assume that different agents may be using different rules, and that there are exactly k 
h 1 I _ ( I I I ) k _ ( k k k) th t• t 1 k b sue ru es c - c
1
, c2, c3 , ••• , c - c1, c2, c3 , en we can es 1ma e c , ... , c , f y 
n 
(
Al Ak A
) 
II Jch f( 11 11 ) c , ... ,c ,t: =argmaxc1 c"f max ' x1, • • •  ,xt , .
.. 
, 
' ll=l h
E{l, ... ,k}
• ( 4.1) 
Now, we have defined for each allowable number of decision rules k how we can estimate 
the maximum likelihood collection of rules. By defining 
jh = 1 if h = argmaxh'e{1, ... ,k}r ·l (x�, . .. , x:J;
{ 
� 
11 0 otherwise 
Then, we can estimate Ph, the proportion of our population using rule h, via the maximum 
likelihood estimate 
A 1 � Ah Ph= - �!11. n s=l 
In the following section, we shall prove the consistency of our estimates of k, ( c1, . . •  , ck),
and (p1, • . •  , pk)· But in order to get a consistent estimate of k, we need first to introduce 
an information criterion which incorporates a penalty for the number of parameters in the 
model .1 We shall prove that any strictly increasing penalty function with bounded increments 
will yield consistent estimate of k, the ch's, t:, and the Ph's  (all we actually need is that the
increments of the penalty not increase at too high a rate) ; but we propose one particular such 
penalty with a pseudo-Bayesian interpretation. If we start with a prior O'.k on the model with 
k rules, and for each such model introduce a prior 7rk(c1, ... , ck) 0 µk(dt:), then the Bayes
procedure will pick the model which maximizes the log Bayes posterior 
Choosing the prior irk(.) to be uninformative (assigning prior probability 8!1c to each possible
k-tuple of rules in Q:k), letting µk(dt:) be uniform for all k, letting O'.k = �' and assuming
that the maximal likelihood term dominates all other terms in the Bayes posterior (which 
assumption is asymptotically justified), we choose the model which maximizes 
log (IT max /5h·i(x�, ... ,x:J) - 3k log(8)- k log(2).
a=l hE{l, ... ,k} 
1 There is a substantial literature on the ,problem of choosing an Q,ptimatpenalty for the complexity of 
a model. The best known, and one of the earliest, is Akaike (1974)'s criterion (which picks the model that 
maximizes the maximal log likelihood less the number of parameters). Another very popular information 
criterion was introduced by Schwarz (1978), which picks the model that maximizes log of the maximal 
likelihood less the number of parameters multiplied by log of the sample size, divided by two. Many other 
criteria are implicit in the coding literature such as Wallace and Boulton (1968)'s Minimum Message Length, 
and Rissanen (1978)'s Minimum Description Length. Each of these procedures has its epistemic advantages, 
and some (e.g. Schwarz (1978)) have known asymptotic properties for a given class of likelihood functions.
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Notice that if we take logs of base 2, and if our parameter space �k were continuous, this
would reduce to the Akaike information criterion. We are now ready to prove the consistency 
of the general class of procedures to which our procedure belongs. The readers who are not 
interested in the proof of the consistency of our procedure can skip the following section and 
proceed directly to section 6. 
5 Consistency of Our Procedure
We start this section by a more general statement of the procedure. We collect data on n 
individuals , each of whom gets to perform t independent tasks. The number of tasks can
be different for different individuals, but since we study the asymptotics as t j oo, and then
as n T oo, we shall simplify the notation by suppressing that possible difference. There are 
k rules being used in the population, each defining a likelihood function fh E J' (which is a
density function on JR). Without loss of generality, we further assume that the k rules are
distinct; i.e. if I f:- h, then f1 f:- fh· Of course, if two rules were observationally equivalent
(induce the same likelihood function), then there is no loss in treating them as one rule. Our
data is of the form {x�; i = 1, . . . , n;j = 1, . . .  , t}. Let Jih = 1 if agent i uses rule h, and
Jih = 0 otherwise. We further assume that xL ... x; is an i.i.d. sample from fh if Jih = 1, and
that x� E JR; i = 1. ... , n;j = 1, ... , t.2 We assume that in the population from which we
sample, the proportion using rule his Ph, where -1 ::; Ph :S 1, and L:j=1 Ph= 1.
We can now define our estimates k, Ji, . . . , Jk, f>1, • • •  , Pk as follows.
(�·.i1 .... ,/k·)=argmaxk'f 1 {
� ( max �logfh(x1i·)) -penalty(k') } .
• I····· k' L hE{l k'} L i=l ..... j=l 
Where penalty( k) is some deterministic increasing function of k, with m ::; penalty( k) -
penalty(k- 1) SM for some finite positive numbers m,M. We then estimate 
where 
Theorem 1 
1 � .h Ph= -LI;' n i=l 
i,h = { if h =argmax1E{l , . .. ,k} jtl log}1(xj);
0 otherwise
2 For instance. in our case, the sufficient statistic for each observation x� is the number x� T E { 0 , 1}.
The results below will still hold if we allow each xj to be a vector in JRd, but in most cases, a re�) sufficient
stat1sl1c will suffice. 
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Proof: We start by considering a given estimate k, and the corresponding sequence of esti­
mates }i, . . .  , f;.;, as t j oo. For all subjects i with /f = 1, define the empirical distribution
function 
frit(e) = �#{x�lx� � e}.
Under the null hypothesis, and since the fh 's are assumed distinct, by the Glivenko-Cantelli 
Lemma, letting Fh(f.) = J�00 fj(x) dx, we have
{ 
} { 1 if /!i = 1 · Pr ��� IF/(e) - Fh(�)I -+ O = 0 oth�rwis�.
Hence, given any two individuals i, i' such that /f = !ft = 1, as t j oo, their two empirical
distributions converge almost surely, which in turn almost surely guarantees that they will be 
classified to the same rule, as t j oo. Therefore, for each I > 0, there exists a sufficiently large 
T such that Vt 2'. T, if i, i' belong to the same class, for all 1 � h � k, Pr{ 1n-i�I < /} = 1.
Choosing / < � minh•(max(l log fh(e) - log fh•(e))I, all subjects of class h will be classified
together with probability one for all t 2'. T.
Now, for each pair i, i' that belong to the same class, let Ti,i' be the number of tasks needed
to have the two in the same class with probability one (such a Ti,i' exists by the previous
paragraph). Let T* = max{ i � i, i' �n} Ti,i'· Then for all t 2'. T*, all individuals b<;longing to
the same group will have been allocated together with probability one. Now, if k < k, that 
means that some classes have been grouped together. Let n' be a group of individuals who 
use rule h, and who are combined with another group that uses rule h'. Let the estimated 
rule for the combined group be !;.. . The gain from adding one more rule is greater than
2:::7�1 I::�=1[/og(fh(x�)) - log(f;,(xj))]. For all t 2'. T, and as t gets larger, this term diverges,
eventually exceeding M (the bound on the incremental penalty for adding an extra rule). 
Hence, for all t 2'. T*, the probability of k < k is zero.3 On the other hand, if k > k, then as
t j oo, k - k rules will have no members (since all members of the same class are classified
3In our application, let h (the rule to which then' subjects are classified) differ from h (their true rule) in
a collection of observations (prior and number of drawn N's) that occur with some probability p (notice that 
p > 0 by the distinctness of the rules). In the limit the contribution of each of the subjects when classified
to rule h when indeed they use rule h is
( ()(1-p)t(l-�) (()(1-p)t� (()pt(!-�) ( ()pt�
1-- x - x - x 1--2 2 2 2 , 
whereas their contribution to the likelihood function when they are correctly classified to rule h is
( ( )·t(t-5) (()"t�
1-- x - . 2 2 
The likelihood ratio (the second term divided by the first, measuring the gain from creating a new rule for ( )pt(!-<)
that one individual) is 1 � � , which for f < 1 diverges to infinity as t l oo, thus proving that the log
likelihood gain will eventually overtake the maximum penalty M, and a new rule will be allowed. 
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together and there are only k classes), hence the contribution to the likelihood from those 
extra classes will converge to zero, eventually falling below m, and we shall discard those 
extra rules. Therefore, for all t ::?: T*, the probability of k > k is zero. Combining the two
results, we know that k = k almost surely, for all t ::?: T*. 
Now that we have established that as t j oo, the number of classes k is almost surely
correctly estimated by k, and the individuals are almost surely correctly classified with
the other individuals who use the same rule, the rest of the results follow trivially. The 
almost sure estimation of p1, . . . , Pk correctly by f>1, • . .  , Pk as n j oo follows from the strong
law of large numbers (moreover, a central limit theorem applies, and we can construct 
confidence intervals for the Ph's). The consistent estimation of the rules Ji, ... , fk also follows 
immediately from the Glivenko-Cantelli Lemma (and pointwise Central limit theorems apply, 
which we can use to estimate confidence intervals for the fh 's ). I 
6 The Data Analysis
Now, having established the consistency of our estimation/classification procedure, we pro­
ceed to discuss its implementation. For a given k, a rather crude method for estimating 
c1, . . . , ck and t would be to loop over all possible classifications of the n subjects to the
various rules, estimate the maximal likelihood rules used by each class, and pick the classi­
fication that yields the maximal overall likelihood. This brute-force method would not be 
feasible for reasonably large k and n, since for each k-tuple of rules, the number of possible 
classifications is P (i .e. it grows geometrically in k, and exponentially in n, since we want 
n to be very large, this procedure would be computationally infeasible). Fortunately, there 
is no need to explicitly loop over all possible classifications. We can implement the classifi­
cation implicitly by using a standard maximization routine for the likelihood function with 
k rules (the dimensionality of the parameter space is now 3k, and the number of possible 
k-tuples of rules is 83k). For each likelihood evaluation of the routine, as we loop through the
data of each of then individuals, we make k likelihood evaluations for that individual 's  data 
using each of the k rules. For the given class of rules under consideration, we classify each 
subject to the rule that maximizes the likelihood of that subject 's data, and the contribution 
of that subject's data to the overall log likelihood function is added to the other subjects' 
as shown in equation ( 4.1 ). Notice that this transforms our problem into a simple likelihood
maximization one. with the number of parameters growing linearly in the number of rules, 
and each likelihood function evaluation growing linearly in the number of agents and number 
of rules. This improvement over the brute-force (geometric/exponential) algorithm makes 
our procedure rather easy to implement by invoking any of the standard multidimensional 
optimization subroutines generally available in mathematical and statistical packages. 
The results that we obtained by applying our algorithm to the data from the four univer­
sities are reported in the seven tables in Appendix A. We had a total of 256 subjects, and the
total number of tasks was 4506. The first 4 tables report the results where we analyze the
data for each of the schools separately. Table I shows our analysis the data from UCLA, Ta­
ble I I  shows the analysis of the data from PCC, Table I I I  shows the analysis of the data from 
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Occidental College, and Table IV shows the analysis of the data from CSULA. Tables I-IV 
report estimates up to k = 7. Tables V and VI report the maximimum likelihood estimates,
and the value of our information criterion, for all the subjects who were payed according to 
the outcome, and all the subjects who were payed a flat fee, respectively. Table VII reports 
the estimates and information criterion for k = 1, 2, 3, for all the subjects in our sample
pooled together. In each of these tables, for a number of given k's, we report the maxi­
mum likelihood estimates of E, the maximum likelihood estimate of ( c�, c�, c1) , ... , ( c�, c�, c�) 
(with the number of subjects allocated to each of the rules shown in parentheses), the value 
of the maximal l ikelihood for the model with k rules, and the information criterion that we 
introduced in Section 4 (JC = log(maximal likelihood) - 3k log(8) - k log(2)). When our
information criterion told us to stop after a certain number of rules, we indicated that by 
italicizing the values of the IC that tell us that we should not use a model with that many 
parameters . 
In order to faci litate the understanding of the rules that our algorithm estimated, we now 
identify three of those rules : 
• A subject who correctly uses Bayes's rule chooses cage A if the prior in favor of cage
A was 1/3 and the number of N's was greater than 4, the prior in favor of A was 1/2
and the number of N's was greater than 3, or the prior in favor of A was 2/3 and the
number N's observed was more than 2; otherwise cage B is chosen. In our notation,
that means that the cutoff rule ( c1, c2, c3)=( 432) corresponds to Bayes's rule.
• A subject who judges likelihood using the representativeness heuristic would have the
same cutoff for all three priors (i.e. c1 = c2 = c3) . Since 3 is representative of the
parent distribution in cage B, and 4 is representative of the parent distribution in cage
A. a subject using the representativeness heuristic will pick cage B if 3 N's are drawn,
and pick cage A if 4 N's are drawn. The representative heuristic together with our
rationality assumption that more N's should be treated as increased evidence in favor
of cage A, makes a subject using that heuristic pick cage B if the number of observed
N's is less than or equal to 3, and cage A if the numbe of observed N's is greater than
or equal to 4, resulting in the cutoff rule (333) .
• A third class of subjects that we wish to identify are conservative Bayesians. Those
subjt>cts give more weight to the prior odds than Bayes's formula (posterior odds =
prior odds x likelihood ratio) dictates. For instance, subjects using the cutoff rule
(.5:31 ) . requiring six N's to be observed in order to pick cage A (where five N's would
be enough to convince a Bayesian to pick that cage) when the prior favoring A is 1/3,
and one N to.be observed in...ordei; .to....pick . c;.age...B..{.wh'in:e,J,.w� Nls. would be enough to 
convince a Bayesian to make that choice) when the prior favoring A is 2/3, are clearly
giving too much weight to the prior information and hence needing extra evidence
to be convinced to change their prior pick. Note that due to the discreteness of our
observations. subjects could be conservative and yet use the rule (432) . However,
subjects using (531 ) are definitely conservative (see Edwards (1982)).
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We summarize the most important aspects of our results below: 
• For all tables but Occidental College and CSULA, when we force the algorithm to
choose only one rule, it picks the rule ( 432) , which corresponds to Bayesian updating.
Even in the two institutions where ( 432) was not picked initially as the first most likely
rule, when we allowed the algorithm to pick more rules, ( 432) surfaced and dominated
all the other :rules. With the exception of the PCC table, the ( 432) Bayesian rule is
the most prominent (with more subjects allocated to it than any other rule) regardless
of how many rules we allowed the algorithm to pick.
• The second most prominent rule in all but the PCC table (where it is the most promi­
nent) is (333) which corresponds to making the decision based on the likelihood ratio,
ignoring the prior. This rule has been named the "representativeness" rule by psychol­
ogists, and its robustness regardless of the number of rules that we allow our algorithm
to pick is also remarkable.
• The third most prominent rule that we pick in all tables once enough rules are allowed is
(531) which corresponds to weighting the prior more than its share in Bayes's formula
(posterior odds = prior odds x likelihood ratio). This rule also has been discussed
in the psychology literature, and it has been given the name "conservatism" since it
requires more data to change one's mind than Bayes's rule dictates.
• We note that the algorithm was free to pick any of the possible rules. For instance,
when three rules are allowed , where most of the Tables have picked the rules ( 432) ,
(333) , and (5�11) in that order, there are a total of 89 = 134, 217, 728 rules available, of
which the algorithm picked our three most prominent rules.
• Of our four schools, UCLA had the lowest estimated c, followed by PCC, followed by
Occidental Col lege, and CSULA had the highest estimate of the error rate t. Also,
Tables V and VI show that our estimate of l for the subjects who were payed according
to the outcome was lower than its counterpart for the subjects who were payed a flat
fee. Moreover, the ordering of the schools, and of those who were payed according to
the two systems , is almost the same when we inspect the proportions who use Bayes's
rule.
Some cautionary notes are in order before we conclude this paper. Even though our 
procedure has been proven to yield consistent estimates of the number of rules , and the rules 
themselves , there are a few issues that may arise in finite samples. We discuss some of those 
issues in the framewo.rk of .our-ap.plication. 
• In finite samples, certain individuals' data could have the same likelihood under two or
more rules. For instance, it is conceivable that an individual's collection of observations
(p,N) (where pis the induced prior, and N is the number N's observed) all fall in the
class of observations that are treated identically by rules ( 531) and ( 521) (for instance,
if there were no data points where prior 2 was induced , and 3 N's were drawn). In those
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cases, the likelihood function will have multiple maxima, and we are free to choose any 
one of them. In the tables reported in the appendix, we gave the benefit of the doubt 
to rules that were a priori more appealing to us (e.g. ( 432) was chosen any time it was 
tied with one of the other rules). This limitation is not severe since in  large samples, 
the multiple maxima will vanish, and since the rules we gave priority in breaking ties 
were the ones that were picked by the algorithm when fewer rules were allowed for (e.g. 
where ( 432) is the rule being picked when only one is allowed). 
• Our information criterion is not sufficiently severe in punishing models with a large
number of rules. For instance, where it did indicate that we should stop in the UCLA
Table I with six rules, one rule has only 4 subjects (less than 5% of the population)
allocated to it. When we allowed for a seventh rule, only 2 subjects were allocated to
that rule, and now the information criterion's penalty for the extra rule was enough to
tell us to stop. The worst illustration of the permissiveness of our i nformation criterion
is in the Occidental College Table III, where the seventh rule (111) (which is a very
strange rule, equivalent to almost always choosing cage A, regardless of the prior and
outcome) only picked one individual out of 56, and our information criterion (which
told us to stop with five rules) does not prefer six rules to seven. Of course, on the
posi tive side, the rule of almost always picking cage A may be a legitimate rule that
some subjects are using. Our theory suggests that if such a rule were correct, regardless
of how few individuals used it, then it should indeed be picked by the algorithm. If it
is not a rule that anyone uses, but we are simply picking the idiosyncratic behavior of
a subject in this particular collection of tasks, then more tasks should be assigned to
that subject in order to be able to determine if that is a legitimate rule.
We note on the positive side that those issues arising in finite samples can be resolved 
not only by letting the number of tasks and the number of individuals get large, but also 
by considerations of optimal experimental design. Our data set was not constructed for 
the purposes of this paper (see Grether (1980) for discussion). For i nstance, if we were 
interested in distinguishing models which give different weights to the prior odds and the 
likelihood ratio (which seems a reasonable goal after we saw the rules that our algorithm 
picked), then the design with the flat prior (prior 2) would probably have been omitted due 
to its uninformativeness. Also, the data generating mechanism was chosen to increase the 
probability of getting outcomes that mimic the parent distribution. That design may be 
suboptimal for our purposes, and we probably would have chosen a larger number of priors, 
and more draws from the cages to reduce the probability of ties between various rules. The 
essential point to note is that our procedure's performance can be made as good as one 
wishes, even 1n finit� samples '(given t and n,, by studying issues of optimal experimental
design (choice of priors, and the number of draws from each cage, for instance) to minimize 
the occurrence of ties , and maximize the sharpness of our information criterion (which serves 
as an Ockham's razor ) .  
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8 Appendix A
Table I 
UCLA 
No. of Rules f. Rules (#) Likelihood IC 
1 0.3 432 (97) 6. 726 x 10-363 -840.864 
2 0.3 432 (71) 3.026 X 10-J:.lH -768.003 
333 (26) 
3 0.2 432 (50) 7.018 x 10-311 -734.950 
333 (26)
531 (21)
4 0.2 432 ( 46) 2.44 7 x 10-301 -719.909 
333 (24) 
531 (19) 
443 (8) 
5 0.2 432 ( 46) 1. 300 x 10  .::15 -713.658 
333 (24) 
531 (17) 
443 ( 4) 
543 (6) 
6 0.2 432 (46) 7. 769 x 10-291 -709.591 
333 (19) 
531 (17)
443 (6) 
311 (5) 
541 ( 4) 
7 0.2 432 ( 44) 6.220 x 10-289 -712.139 
333 (19) 
531 (17) 
443 (6) 
311 (5) 
541 ( 4) 
441 (2) 
14 
No. of Rules t 
1 0.4 
2 0.3 
3 0.3 
4 0.2 
5 0.2 
6 0.2 
7 0.2 
Table II 
PCC 
Rules (#) 
432 (66)
432 (31)
333 (35) 
432 (25)
333 (35) 
531 (6) 
432 (20) 
333 (33) 
531 (6) 
444 (7) 
432 (18)
333 (28) 
531 (6) 
444 (7) 
332 (7) 
432 (15)
333 (23) 
531 (6) 
444 (7) 
332 (7) 
433 (8)
432 (13)
333 (23) 
531 (6) 
444 (5) 
332 (7) 
433 (8) 
111 (0) 
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Likelihood 
7.412 X 10-�U;j 
2.276 X 10 10� 
7.770 x 10-155 
5.668 x 10-148 
3.012 x 10-142 
1.601 x 10-136 
1.601 x 10-136 
IC 
-472.353 
-386.059 
-375.645 
-366.774 
-360.522 
-354.270 
-361.201 
Table III 
Occidental College 
No. of Rules f Rules (#) Likelihood IC 
1 0.4 332 (56) 4.075 X 1 0-:..mo -479.859 
2 0.3 332 ( 47) 2.831 x 10-185 -438.801 
511 (9) 
3 0.3 432 (28) 3.300 x 10-170 -411.040 
333 (19) 
511 (9) 
4 0.3 432 (21) 1.988 x 10-163 -402.360 
333 ( 13) 
332 (14) 
511 (8) 
5 0.3 432 (16) 1.616 x 10-159 -400.288 
333 ( 13) 
532 (8) 
332 (12) 
511 (7) 
6 0.3 432 (18) 1.198 x 10-156 -400.611 
333 (12) 
332 (14) 
542 (3) 
511 (7) 
222 (2) 
7 0.2 432 (19) 1.976 x 10-153 -400.135 
333 ( 14) 
332 (10) 
531 ( 4) 
542 (3) 
511 (5) 
111 (1) 
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No. of Rules f_ 
1 0.5 
2 0.4 
3 0.4 
4 0.4 
5 0.3 
6 0.3 
7 0.3 
Table IV 
CS ULA 
Rules (#) 
433 (37) 
432 (24 ) 
333 (13) 
432 (16) 
333 (12 ) 
433 (9) 
432 (11) 
333 (11 ) 
531 (7) 
433 (8) 
432 (10) 
333 (11) 
531 (6) 
542 (2) 
433 (8) 
432 (9) 
333 (11 ) 
531 (5) 
433 (7) 
542 (2) 
444 (3) 
432 (8 ) 
333 (11 ) 
531 (5) 
433 (7) 
444 (3) 
542 (2) 
442 ( 1) 
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Likelihood 
1.141 x 10 lbll 
6.137 x 10-152 
4.022 x 10-147 
1.748 x 10-143 
9.598 x 10-141 
3.082 x 10-l;j!:I 
9.897 x 10-138 
IC 
-395.936 
-362.042 
-357.883 
-356.437 
-357.060 
-360.523 
-363.985 
Table V 
All Schools-payed according to outcome 
Ne •. of Rules l Rules (#) Likelihood IC 
1 0.4 432 (125) 1.229 x 10-431 -999.140 
2 0.3 432 (85) 1.354 x 10-�:l -893.147 
333 ( 40) 
3 0.3 432 (64) 1.678 x 10-361 -851.510 
333 (38) 
531 (23) 
4 0.3 432 (55) 1.042 x 10-351 -835.892 
333 (31) 
531 (22) 
433 (17) 
5 0.3 432 ( 44) 4.595 x 10-<S44 -825.222 
333 (28) 
531 (21) 
433 (20) 
332 (12) 
6 0.2 432 ( 43) 2.198 x 10-337 -816. 773 
333 (26) 
531 (19) 
433 (19) 
332 (12) 
543 (6) 
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Table VI 
All Schools-payed a flat fee 
No. of Rules f Rules (#) Likelihood IC 
1 0.4 432 (131) 1.188 x 10-520 -1204.104 
2 0.3 432 (77) 3.693 x 10-449 -1045.417 
333 (54) 
3 0.3 432 (56) 2.594 x 10-4� -1003.045 
333 (53) 
521 (22) 
4 0.3 432 (51) 5.174 x 10-416 -983.958 
333 (51) 
542 (10)
521 (19)
5 0.3 432 ( 49) 1. 767 x 10-4os -973.543 
333 ( 40) 
531 (10) 
433 (19)
332 (13)
6 0.3 432 ( 41) 1.064 x 10-401 -964.864 
333 (38) 
542 (10) 
521 (19)
332 (13)
433 (10) 
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Table VII 
All Schools 
No. of Rules f Rules (#) Likelihood IC 
1 0.4 432 (256) 1.460 x 10-951 -2196.312 
2 0.3 432 (162) 4.999 x 10-831 -1925.702 
333 (94) 
3 0.3 432 (120) 1.355 x 10-189 -1837.230 
333 (92) 
531 ( 44) 
20 
9 Appendix B
Table 1: Raw data on 20 tasks for 48 subjects in UCLA who were each payed a bonus of $10 if they made
the correct choice on a randomly drawn task. The first line contains a list of the 20 priors for the 20 tasks 
(2 refers to the prior of 1/3 in favor of cage A, 3 refers to the prior of 1/2 in favor of cage A, and 4 refers 
to the prior of 2/3 in favor of cage A). The second line contains a list of the 20 outcomes (number of N's 
observed, between 0 and 6). The last 48 lines contain the 20 choices of each of the subjects (choosing cage 
A is coded as 1, and choosing cage B is coded as 0) , for each of the tasks. 
22443322443322443322 
0 4444243454554445544 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 11110 0 0 11111111110 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 l 1 0 1 0 l l 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
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Table 2: Raw data on 20 tasks for 49 subjects in UCLA who were each payed a flat fee for participating
in the experiment. The first line contains a list of the 20 priors for the 20 tasks (2 refers to the prior of 1/3 
in favor of cage A ,  3 refers to the prior of 1/2 in favor of cage A ,  and 4 refers to the prior of 2/3 in favor of 
cage A).  The second line contains a list of the 20 outcomes (number of N's observed, between 0 and 6). The 
last 49 lines contain the 20 choices of each of the subjects (choosing cage A is coded as 1, and choosing cage 
B is coded as 0), for each of the tasks. 
22442444334442434244 
44143436445554224343 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 I 0 1 0 1 1 0 I I 1 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 0 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 I 
1 0 0 1 0 I 0 I 0 1 1 0 I I I I I 0 I 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 I 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 I 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 I 0 I 0 I I I 1 1 1 0 0 0 I 0 I 1 
0 0 0 I 0 1 I 1 1 1 I I I 0 0 0 I 0 I I 
0 0 0 I 0 I 1 1 0 0 1 I 1 0 I 1 I 0 I 1 
1 0 0 1 0 I I I I 1 1 I I 0 0 0 I 0 I I 
0 1 0 I 0 I 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 I I 0 I 1 0 0 I 1 0 1 0 
1 0 0 I 0 1 I I I 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 I 0 I 0 
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 I 1 I I 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 I I 0 1 1 I 1 0 0 0 1 0 I 0 
1 1 0 1 0 1 I 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 I I 0 1 0 I 0 1 I 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 I 
I 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 I I I 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 I 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 I 0 I 0 
I I 0 1 0 1 1 I 1 0 1 I 1 0 0 0 I 0 I 0 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 I 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 I I 
0 I 1 0 I 0 I 1 I 1 0 I I 0 0 0 I 0 1 I 
0 0 0 I 0 I 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 I 0 
1 1 0 1 I 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 I I I 1 0 I 0 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
01010111111110 0 0 1 0 11 
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 I I I 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 I 0 I I I I I I I 1 0 I 0 1 0 1 1 
1 1 I I 0 0 0 0 I 1 I I I 0 0 0 I 0 1 1 
0 I 0 I 0 I I I 1 0 I I I 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 0 I 0 I I 1 I I I I I 0 0 0 1 0 I 0 
0 1 1 1 0 1 I I 1 l 1 1 I 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
0 l 0 I 0 1 0 I I 1 1 I I 0 0 0 1 0 I 0 
l 1 1 1 0 1 I I 0 0 1 I I 0 1 0 l 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 I 0 1 1 I 1 I I I 0 0 I 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 l l 1 l 1 0 0 0 1 I 1 0 
1 0 0 I 0 1 I 1 I I 1 1 1 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 
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Table 3: Raw data on 14 tasks for 35 subjects in PCC who were each payed a bonus of $10 if they made
the correct choice on a randomly drawn task. The first line contains a list of the 14 priors for the 14 tasks 
(2 refers to the prior of 1/3 in favor of cage A, 3 refers to the prior of 1/2 in favor of cage A, and 4 refers 
to the prior of 2/3 in favor of cage A) .  The second line contains a list of the 14 outcomes (number of N's 
observed, between 0 and 6). The last 35 lines contain the 14 choices of each of the subjects (choosing cage 
A is coded as 1, and choosing cage B is coded as 0) , for each of the tasks. 
22442244332244 
42325544332336 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 I I 0 0 I I 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 I 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 I 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 I 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 I 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 I I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 
0 0 I 0 0 I 0 I 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 I 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 I 0 0 0 1 I 
1 0 I 0 I I I 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 1 I I I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Table 5:  Raw data on 14 tasks for 25 subjects in Occidental College who were each payed a bonus of $ 10 
if they made the correct choice on a randomly drawn task. The first line contains a list of the 14 priors for 
the 14 tasks (2 refers to the prior of 1/3 in favor of cage A, 3 refers to the prior of 1/2 in favor of cage A, and 
4 refers to the prior of 2/3 in favor of cage A).  The second line contains a list of the 14 outcomes (number 
of N's observed, between 0 and 6). The last 25 lines contain the 14 choices of each of the subjects (choosing 
cage A is coded as 1, and choosing cage B is coded as 0), for each of the tasks. 
22442244332242 
14423 3 5343 53 33 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
25 
Tab le 6: Raw data ion 19 tasks for 31 subjects in PCC who were each payed a flat fee for participating 
in the experiment. The first line contains a list of the 19 priors for the 19 tasks (2 refers to the prior of 1/3 
in favor of cage A ,  3 refers to the prior of 1/2 in favor of cage A ,  and 4 refers to the prior of 2/3 in favor of 
cage A). The second line contains a list of the 19 outcomes (number of N's observed, between 0 and 6). The 
last 31 lines contain the 19 choices of each of the subjects (choosing cage A is coded as 1, and choosing cage 
B is coded as 0) , for ea.ch of the tasks. 
2244224433332244333 
432543246 4225232322 
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 7: Raw data on 19 tasks for 17 subjects in CSULA who were each payed a bonus of $10 if they 
made the correct choice on a randomly drawn task. The first line contains a list of the 19 priors for the 19 
tasks (2 refers to the prior of 1/3 in favor of cage A, 3 refers to the prior of 1/2 in favor of cage A,  and 4 
refers to the prior of 2/3 in favor of cage A) .  The second line contains a list of the 19 outcomes (number of 
N's observed, between 0 and 6). The last 17 lines contain the 19 choices of each of the subjects (choosing 
cage A is coded as 1, and choosing cage B is coded as 0) , for each of the tasks. 
2244224433444344423 
5356 5424536 44314344 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Table 8: Raw data on 19 tasks for 20 subjects in PCC who were each payed a flat fee for participating
in the experiment. The first line contains a list of the 19 priors for the 19 tasks (2 refers to the prior of 1/3 
in favor of cage A ,  3 refers to the prior of 1/2 in favor of cage A, and 4 refers to the prior of 2/3 in favor of 
cage A).  The second line contains a list of the 19 outcomes (number of N's observed, between 0 and 6). The 
last 20 lines contain the 19 choices of each of the subjects (choosing cage A is coded as 1, and choosing cage 
B is coded as 0) ,  for each of the tasks.
2244224433332 244332 
3 1334446 554244 12 6 42 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 l 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 l 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 l 0 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 I 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 I 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 I 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 I 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 I I 1 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 I I 1 1 I 0 I I 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 I 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 I 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 I 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 I 1 0 0 1 1 0
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10 Appendix C 
Instructions 
Social Security Number: 
The experimenters are trying to determine how people make decisions. We have designed 
a simple choice experiment and we shall ask you to make decisions at various times. The 
amount of money (DESIGN I: will not) (DESIGN II :  will) depend on how good your decisions 
are. (DESIGN I: At the end of the experiment you will receive $7) (DESIGN II: At the end 
of the experiment , we shall randomly choose one of your decisions and if it was correct, you 
will receive $15 , and if it was incorrect, you will receive $5).4 
If you look at the person in the front of the room, you will see that he or she has three 
randomizing devices, otherwise known as bingo cages, which are designated as cage A ,  cage 
B ,  and cage X. Inside both cage A and cage B are six balls, some of which are marked with 
an N and some with a G. Cage A has four N's and two G's and cage B has three N's and 
three G's. Inside cage X there are six balls numbered one, two, three, four, five, and six. 
The experiment will proceed as follows. First , we shall ask you to select one individual 
as a monitor to watch the procedures, to examine the equipment , and to make sure that 
the experimenters really are doing what they say they are doing. The monitor should check 
the truthfulness of what the experimenter says, but other than that may not communicate 
any information to you in any way. If the monitor communicates any other information, he 
or she will be asked to leave without payment. The monitor will receive (DESIGN I: $7) 
(DESIGN I I :  $10 ) for his or her efforts. 
(PIC.K VOLUNTEER) 
Now cages A and B are put behind this screen and we spin cage X. Before each run we 
will tell you that if certain numbers come up , we will choose cage A ,  and other wise we will 
choose cage B. For example, if 1 , 2, 3, or 4 are drawn, we will pick cage A; if a 5 or 6 is
drawn, we will pick cage B. After drawing from cage X, the monitor will be asked to choose 
the appropriate cage (A or B) from behind the screen. Now the experimenter will make six 
draws from the cage. replacing the drawn ball each time. He will write the results of the 
draws on the board . You will be asked to indicate on your answer sheet whether you think 
the draws came from cage A or cage B .  
4Legend : DESIGN I = Subjects are payed a flat fee. DESIGN I I  = Subjects are payed a bonus i f  a
randomly chosen choice was correct. 
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Cage A has 4 N's and 2 G 's. 
Cage B has 3 N's and 3 G 's. 
Answer Sheet 
Run No. 0 In this run there are -- chances out of 6 for choosing cage A and -­
chances for choosing cage B. 
Record the results for this run: - - - - - -. 
Circle the one you think the balls came from. Cage A Cage B 
Run No. 1 In this run there are -- chances out of 6 for choosing cage A and -­
chances for choosing cage B .  
Record the results for this run: - - - - - - . 
Circle the one you think the balls came from. Cage A Cage B 
Run No. 2 In this run there are -- chances out of 6 for choosing cage A and -­
chances for choosing cage B .  
Record the results for this run: - - - - - -. 
Circle the one you think the balls came from. Cage A Cage B 
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